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 Recent technological innovation in microchip processors, robotics, and 
artificial intelligence has the potential to create a perfect storm that radi-
cally transforms the structure and organization of work. In particular, the 
rise of “smart” machines on assembly lines, delivery drones, and self-driving 
vehicles are likely to eliminate many kinds of jobs in the near future. 1 
The prospect of such changes raises serious concerns about the impact 
of technology on human values and what will happen to the welfare 
of millions of workers whose livelihoods are rendered obsolete. At the 
same time, democratic welfare states continue to struggle with inequality 
in many spaces, including education, gender and racial discrimination, 
unemployment and stagnant wages, poverty, and wealth disparity. These 
problems have also been intensified by technology and globalization. 
Despite an unprecedented expansion of access to information and com-
munication the digital revolution has made possible, inequality in devel-
oped countries is at record levels, and the gap with developing countries 
grows wider ( Pikkety 2014 ). 
 Given these developments, a novel proposal that is the subject of debate 
among both academics and policymakers is now gaining fresh momen-
tum: Provide all citizens with a “basic income” that ensures a social mini-
mum. The strategy of this proposal is to give all qualified individuals 
an unrestricted cash grant that provides them with all-purpose means 
that do not depend on status, wealth, or employment. Without restric-
tions, individuals can choose for themselves how best to utilize the grant. 
Some of these choices may include reducing work hours, increasing lei-
sure time, investing in financial markets, creating small businesses, or 
consuming more goods. The creation of this social minimum might also 
alleviate some of the problems of inequality just described. For example, 
the automation of workplaces will mean fewer jobs in the future, so the 
provision of a basic income could be an efficient solution to a rather 
complex set of problems. 
 Can basic income replace work in the age of automation? More spe-
cifically, we want to know whether a basic income scheme can replace 
the benefits of work in an age where technology has the potential to 
15032-2440-006.indd   90 6/15/2019   12:00:17 PM
Work, Technology, and Inequality 91
eliminate work altogether. Work has financial and non-pecuniary ben-
efits. While it provides individuals with an income to satisfy their needs, 
it also has benefits in the form of self-realization, self-respect, and com-
munity. However, work also entails various burdens in the form of low 
wages, overwork, and diminished autonomy. The provision of a univer-
sal cash grant can supplement the financial benefits of work by giving 
individuals flexible means to maximize their choices and achieve their 
goals. To the extent it is used to reduce work hours in favor of leisure, or 
expand occupational choice, basic income can improve the welfare of its 
beneficiaries. There is still the question whether such a grant can replace 
the non-pecuniary benefits of work. To answer the question, we shall 
investigate these overlapping areas of concern, which are the benefits and 
burdens of work, the effects of technology on work and welfare, the ben-
efits of basic income, and the limits of this scheme for a social minimum. 
 The first section examines the benefits and burdens of work, draw-
ing a distinction between its financial and non-pecuniary benefits in the 
form of self-realization, self-respect, and community. In the second sec-
tion, the effects of technology on work are considered. Although innova-
tion can improve efficiency, and has the potential to enhance welfare for 
this reason, the effect of this process has been the intensification of labor 
and, ultimately, its obsolescence. For this reason, the automation of work 
does have significant costs to the welfare of workers, and these ought to 
be weighed against its potential benefits in the future. The third section 
examines the arguments for a basic income that make it a philosophically 
attractive alternative to traditional welfare policies. One reason is that a 
universal cash grant avoids some classical objections to the welfare state 
including that of paternalism and “free riding.” A basic income scheme 
might be a clever way of avoiding these problems, but without addressing 
the structure of property relations that gives rise to them, it is doubtful 
it can reduce inequality. Finally, the last section focuses on the question 
whether the benefits of basic income can replace the loss of work caused 
by automation and obsolescence. Even though it can augment the finan-
cial benefits of work, or supplement their loss, a cash grant by itself can-
not replace its non-pecuniary benefits. 
 The Benefits and Burdens of Work 
 The value of work is defined by two recurring themes historically. The 
first emerges from the Reformation and has the optimistic view that work 
is a  good for individuals. In his classic study of it, Max Weber argues the 
“protestant ethic,” which is composed of hard work and deferred gratifi-
cation among other things, is the “spirit” that animates modern capital-
ism. He claims that part of what makes this mode of production distinct 
from past forms of accumulation is “the rational capitalistic organization 
of formally free labour.” In combination with “the separation of business 
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from the household” and “rational book-keeping,” capitalism allows 
individuals to pursue their self-interest while promoting the welfare of 
others (Weber 1930: xxxv). In this respect, the work ethic also fulfills a 
divine command to do “good works and deeds” in this life. The second 
theme is far older and pessimistic: Work is a burden suited for lesser men, 
or even punishment imposed on humans for violating divine law. The 
first belief figures in Greco-Roman thought, which holds that the highest 
good of contemplation is opposed to physical toil and justifies the hier-
archy of the  polis that is built on slave labor. The second can be found 
in Judeo-Christian thought from the Book of Genesis to the writings of 
St. Augustine and beyond. Taken together, the themes that work can be 
a force for good as well as burdensome alternatively figure in our own 
understanding of work. 2 
 Let us start by considering the benefits of work. In a market economy, 
work  is an activity requiring the time and labor power of individuals 
who receive compensation for it. Work has obvious benefits that are 
instrumental for this reason. With the compensation earned from work, 
individuals have the means to satisfy their needs and create financial 
stability to make future plans including retirement. The value is instru-
mental because work is a mere means to other ends. By providing uni-
versal means in the form of money, which can be used to buy goods or 
invest in their own social capital, individuals exercise their autonomy, 
make choices about how to prioritize needs, and satisfy their desires. One 
might object that work has no value in itself for this very reason. If it has 
instrumental value only because it provides individuals with an income, 
then these means have value and not work. [This raises a question about 
basic income and whether individuals will work if they are provided with 
other means that do not depend on gainful employment. We shall return 
to this question later, when we examine the benefits of basic income and 
whether they can replace work.] 
 There are other benefits to work that are not instrumental. These 
include the role it plays in the self-realization of individuals, the self-
respect they gain from it, and the sense of community it fosters. What 
role does work play in terms of self-realization? Jon Elster defines it as 
“the self-externalization and self-actualizing deployment of one’s powers 
and abilities” (Elster 1988: 66). He claims that self-realization is not only 
the most important work-related value, but also its most peripheral for 
the following reason: In market economies, production is decentralized, 
so there are many job opportunities for individuals to choose from. This 
decentralization also means “that working conditions for most people 
in contemporary industrial societies—capitalist and communist—do not 
lend themselves to fulfillment of this goal” (Elster 1988: 66). So work has 
the  potential to promote individual self-realization, but this is frustrated 
by the fact that most work in market economies does not require much of 
individuals in terms of their capacities. However, the lack of fit between 
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“self-realization” as Elster defines it, and opportunities for work that can 
realize it, suggests that the standard here might be set too high. 3 
 What do “powers and abilities” mean in this context, and how do they 
realize the self? Arguably, all work involves the use of these capacities 
since any activity requiring the use of labor power to produce goods 
or provide services entails the use of at least some of these. To be sure, 
there are “powers and abilities” such as mathematical skills that are 
more complex and deliberative and that require more education. These 
are typically rewarded with more compensation than skills that are sim-
ple and non-deliberative. However, the difference between these skill 
sets is not a binary, at least where the “deployment of powers and abili-
ties” is concerned. The difference is rather one of degree. The concepts 
of “complexity” and “simplicity” are continuous and admit of more or 
less degrees when applied to skills that are utilized for work. So mak-
ing or doing something of any kind requires using “powers and abili-
ties” whether these are more or less skilled. It seems to be a mistake, then, 
to claim that the value of self-realization found in work is peripheral 
because there are few opportunities for work that fulfills this goal. The 
problem with Elster’s conclusion is its implicit perfectionist assumption 
about the “powers and abilities” that compose the self. He conceives of 
an ideal “self” with the potential for robust capacities, which are wasted 
in work that requires less knowledge and skills. The implicit ranking of 
skills depends on the view that all individuals should strive to realize their 
greatest potential in highly skilled work. Since only some can do this in 
market economies, that standard is self-defeating. So the self-realization 
that work offers should be agnostic about ranking “powers and abilities” 
in perfectionist terms. Instead, we should affirm a minimal but still sig-
nificant sense in which work promotes self-realization, simply because in 
making or doing something, individuals are externalizing their capacities, 
whatever those happen to be. 
 Another benefit of work is that individuals gain self-respect from it. 
John Rawls claims that self-respect consists of “a person’s sense of his 
own value” and “confidence in one’s ability to fulfil one’s intentions” 
(Rawls 1999: 386). If we take these features in combination, work should 
give individuals a sense of worth and confidence they can achieve their goals. 
Ostensibly, work does measure a sense of worth because of its compensa-
tion. From the viewpoint of the labor market, individuals literally have a 
value placed on them by being paid for their time and labor power. This 
cannot be the basis of worth described by Rawls, however. We must be 
careful not to imply some individuals are  worth more than others simply 
on the basis of the size of their income. From the moral point of view, the 
lives of all individuals have equal worth, so the monetary value of work 
cannot be its source of worth. Instead, it must foster a sense of value that 
is not merely about money, but about something else. 4 Work contributes 
to a person’s sense of worth in at least two other ways. The first is that 
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individuals gain satisfaction from making or doing something that uti-
lizes their labor power. Using their time and skills to produce goods and 
services that others require or desire can be a satisfying endeavor itself. 5 
A second way that work fosters self-respect is because it is a social activ-
ity that involves cooperation with others. This is a crucial source for a 
sense of worth since all of our interactions with others are structured 
by mutual recognition. Individuals depend on one another for achiev-
ing the self-satisfaction of knowing that others regard their actions or 
interests as having value. This is not just a question of having a sense a 
worth because one feels useful to others, though as studies of workers 
and unemployment show, this is part of the reason why work fosters self-
respect. 6 Work also entails other kinds of social interaction that support 
a sense of worth. These include camaraderie, friendships, water cooler 
gossip, teamwork, and even a sense of belonging to a community, which 
can also be found in different forms of association as well. 
 What about the second part of self-respect regarding “confidence” 
that individuals can achieve their goals? Work builds confidence in vari-
ous ways. First, utilizing one’s power and abilities to achieve a personal 
or common goal is essential for gaining confidence. By committing to 
some task and accomplishing it, individuals affirm their own capacities to 
achieve it. The use of their talents, skills, and education all figure in this 
respect. Even low-skill jobs that lack the use of deliberation require indi-
viduals to select the proper means for realizing the ends that are constitu-
tive of the work. Moreover, research shows that on-the-job training for 
low-skill jobs does build confidence and develops human capital in the 
form of commitment, time management, responsibility, and other quali-
ties that are useful at work and beyond. 7 Work also promotes confidence 
through social interaction, which is crucial for affirming our sense of how 
well we are doing. Since it is a form of social cooperation, confidence is 
shaped by feedback from employers, co-workers, clients, and custom-
ers alike. This is why modern workplaces are organized by procedures 
of assessment and evaluation—to ensure individuals are doing the tasks 
required by the job and to improve on the execution of those tasks. Taken 
together, the exercise of “powers and abilities” in the context of social 
interaction with other promotes self-respect, in terms of an individual 
developing her own sense of worth and the confidence she gains from it. 
 Finally, work has value because it fosters community. This is both an 
individual and collective good in the following sense. When individuals 
are engaged in common projects that most work entails, they commit 
to them as individuals  and help to realize those projects as members of 
an association. If such a commitment is voluntary, then work is good 
for individuals in all the senses described earlier. It promotes their self-
realization because they must deploy their capacities to produce some 
good or service, and it fosters self-respect because they gain a sense of 
worth and build confidence that they can realize their ends. There is 
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competition in the labor market, of course, where individuals compete 
against others for positions and promotions. This does not mean, how-
ever, that competition exclusively defines work. There can be healthy 
competition that pushes individuals to achieve excellence or otherwise 
excel at whatever talents and skills they happen to have. This also ben-
efits others who rely on their use of such talents and skills. Furthermore, 
the conditions of interdependence found in work signal that there is also 
a collective good that is achieved as well. While it does require engaging 
in common projects that benefit both individuals and communities, from 
the collective viewpoint work also promotes forms of mutual recognition 
such as assurance, trust, and empathy. These are essential for the stability 
and reproduction of the social life of a community, and they give purpose 
and meaning to the work that individuals do in their communities. 
 Now we can consider a serious objection to the idea that work has 
value other than providing individuals with the means to satisfy their 
needs and achieve their ends. Some philosophers reject the claim that 
work is a good in itself because that assumes an essentialist conception of 
work that amounts to paternalism about what is good for all individuals. 
Andrew Levine makes a novel argument for a right  not to work in this 
respect. In a paper titled “Fairness to Idleness,” he claims the liberal com-
mitment to state neutrality regarding conceptions of the good must per-
mit individuals to pursue their own good without favoring one particular 
view over another ( Levine 2001 ). For this reason, an individual’s concep-
tion of the good that eschews work must be given the same weight of 
consideration as an individual who prefers to work. The neutrality thesis 
can be construed along these lines to require the democratic state to pro-
vide individuals with basic goods so they can pursue whatever ends they 
adopt, even if these ends are otherwise thought to be unproductive. In 
effect, neutrality toward the good supports a right to leisure against the 
paternalist principle that it is good for individuals to work and support 
themselves. This means individuals can decide work is not good for them, 
preferring instead to “count blades of grass on the courthouse lawn” or 
take up surfing as a way of life (Rawls 1999: 432). Thus, work has no value 
in itself unless individuals determine that it is good for them. 
 One way to respond to this objection is to show that the benefits of 
work just described do not logically entail paternalism about what is 
good for individuals. With respect to self-realization, we have seen that 
that the “powers and abilities” required for work need not be deliberative 
and require complex skills. The conception that these capacities should 
be deliberative and skilled in order to realize a robust self depends on per-
fectionist principles that we can do without. Whether it involves highly 
complex skills requiring an advanced education or digging trenches for 
sewer lines, all individuals utilize their capacities of labor power at work. 
The intuition that “brain work” is better for realizing the self than “dirty 
work” misses the point that all work is the externalization of human 
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capacities in the service of some end. This line of reasoning applies to 
self-respect and community as well. Individuals in so-called menial jobs 
are no less entitled to a sense of worth and confidence that they get from 
a job well done. Work does not impart self-respect because only the best 
kinds of “powers and abilities” it requires are things worthy of respect. 
As we have shown, much of the value that work imparts depends on 
taking into consideration two things: whether the work itself is done 
well, and whether there are others who recognize that. Indeed, the fact 
that work depends on social interaction is a significant reason why it 
fosters self-respect and community. Without the mutual recognition that 
gives structure to our forms of social interaction, it is hard to conceive 
of values like self-respect and community having any meaning at all. So 
it cannot be the case that work has nothing but instrumental value for 
individuals, because value is determined in the context of inter-subjective 
relations with others. The non-pecuniary value of work does not require 
paternalism about deciding what is good for individuals, then, only that 
it is a good thing for individuals to have social interaction that is a rich 
source of meaning for their own lives. For most individuals, work is that 
daily venue where this interaction takes place, though it is not and need 
not be the only such venue. 
 What about the burdens of work? These burdens include instrumen-
talism, exploitation and coercion, and diminished autonomy. Again, the 
instrumental value of work gives individuals an income that is the means 
to satisfy their needs and pursue their goals. This is external to the work 
itself and employers make provision for it. For this same reason, work 
can also be a burden when it fails to provide enough means for individu-
als to meet needs and support pursuits. The elasticity here suggests that 
its instrumental benefits are only as good as they are sufficient to satisfy 
basic needs and allow individuals to pursue their life plans. If work fails 
to provide enough income to do these things, it easily turns into a bur-
den that is all-too-familiar for those working multiple jobs to make ends 
meet. Indeed, the costs associated with financial instability found among 
the working poor are serious, including the decline of health and eco-
nomic indicators (Singer and Ryff 2001: Ch. 7). The double-edged nature 
of this instrumental value suggests that a minimum wage policy is better 
than no policy at all, but that something like a living wage policy might 
be the best way to maximize the instrumental benefits of work ( Pollin 
and Luce 2000 ). 
 An additional burden of work is the problems of exploitation and 
coercion. These are concerned with the voluntariness of conditions in 
which agreements between employers and workers are made. From the 
moral point of view, exploitation occurs whenever one agent uses another 
merely as a means, whereas coercion involves persuading an agent to do 
something by using force or threats. In the nineteenth century, Bruno 
Bauer and Karl Marx helped to popularize the criticism that capitalism 
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 exploits workers (Breckman 1999). Marx’s theory of exploitation is that 
unequal property relations between owners of the means of production 
and the proletariat enables the former to use the latter for the creation 
of profit, since they pay wages that are far less than the exchange-value 
of the products created by workers (Marx 1844: 324–25). More recently, 
philosophers have examined the problem of coercion regarding labor to 
determine whether employment offers count as instances of coercion. 
Robert Nozick argues that coercion occurs when one agent attempts to 
induce another to act by means of a threat ( Nozick 1974). What distin-
guishes a threat from other kinds of offers is the allegation that there will 
be consequences attached to the recipient if she does not alter her course 
of action accordingly. On this basis, offers of employment in the labor 
market are not supposedly coercive, because there are no threats attached 
to it. If an individual does not like the offer for work, she simply moves 
along to consider further prospective offers. However, other philosophers 
argue that wage offers can still be coercive despite the absence of explicit 
threats. David Zimmerman claims that an offer is coercive under the fol-
lowing conditions: “(1) an alternative pre-proposal situation workers 
would strongly prefer to the actual one is technologically or economi-
cally feasible when the offer is made, and (2) capitalists prevent workers 
from having at least one of these feasible alternative pre-proposal situa-
tions” (Zimmerman 1981: 145). On this view, workers are still coerced 
to accept employment offers because they have no access to better pre-
offer proposals, and property relations under capitalism give employers 
both material and non-material resources to restrict the availability of 
such alternatives. 
 We cannot resolve these problems by evaluating the arguments found 
in an extensive literature. 8 Rather, the point here is to highlight that 
there are conditions of “social unfreedom” relating to the value of work 
as a voluntary choice that must be considered (Ezorksy 2007: 9). Setting 
aside for the moment any substantial differences between exploitation 
and coercion, it is clear that work poses some constraints on autonomy. 
After all, without inheritance or other sources of income, most individu-
als are  obliged to find (and keep) paid work in the labor market. Doing 
so is what gives them independence and self-sufficiency, features we typi-
cally associate with what it means to live a free life. Without work, they 
have to rely on others such as family, friends, churches, or the state to 
satisfy their needs, which is a condition of dependence that is the opposite 
of living a free life. Questions about whether capitalism is exploitative, 
or whether offers for work are coercive in the absence of threats, are 
narrowly tailored and can miss the broader context of these social and 
political relations influencing our work lives. At one level, individuals are 
apparently free to choose from different offers for work (assuming there 
are more jobs than workers looking for them). As we have pointed out, 
this is one set of alternatives, the structure and consequences of which 
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tend to exclude rational consideration of the alternative  not to work. So 
workers are “unfree” in a sense as well. They cannot consider that alter-
native because the consequences of choosing it either expose them to the 
harms of depravation or commit them to dependence on others. These 
harms are widely confirmed by studies of workers dealing with job loss, 
which show that they suffer from severe and chronic medical problems 
ranging from self-doubt and depression to loss of sex drive and suicide 
(Uchitelle 2006: Ch. 8). 
 Finally, work is also a burden because it diminishes autonomy. For 
almost all workers in market economies, the structure and organization 
of work is anti-democratic. We can illuminate this problem by summariz-
ing the “parallel case” argument comparing the similarities of democratic 
states and market firms: 
 [W]henever individuals cooperate together in a rule-governed com-
mon enterprise that should work to their common advantage, they 
all have the right to participate by way of majority-rule procedure in 
making the association rules, provided all have the capacity to do so. 
The political order and the economic firm are both common enter-
prises in the relevant respects, so the right to democratic citizenship 
applies equally in both arenas. 
 (Arneson 1993: 139) 
 Since most firms are organized vertically so that decision-making is cen-
tralized under executive management, workers are prevented from par-
ticipating in decisions affecting their interests. One argument in favor 
of this hierarchical form emphasizes its economic efficiency, citing the 
need for responsiveness to quickly changing market conditions and the 
expertise required for reading these changes. There are clearly costs 
associated with this form of work as well, including lack of autonomy, 
transparency, and accountability that come with centralized decision-
making. Whether such trade-offs are justified by the alleged efficiency 
of such arrangements, or whether there are alternatives that can fulfill 
these values and maintain economic efficiency, is beyond the scope of 
our present concerns. 9 We cannot settle this debate here, but that is not 
essential for a brief review of the claim that anti-democratic work can 
be a burden. 
 There is something insightful about the “parallel case” argument. The 
purpose of the democratic state is to secure individuals liberty by mak-
ing provisions for self-government and protecting their property rights. 
By contrast, the purpose of markets is to set prices on goods and ser-
vices on the basis of the principles of supply and demand, and permit 
both producers and consumers to pursue their own ends accordingly. 
In the former, participation is guaranteed equally by citizenship that is 
protected by the right to vote, public offices that are open to all, and 
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protection of rights to free speech and association. In the latter, there is 
no guarantee for equal participation because the principal entry point in 
the market is finding work, but there is no right to it in the form of guar-
anteed employment. 10 Nevertheless, having and keeping work is thought 
to be essential for living a free life, because without it individuals cannot 
satisfy their own needs and must depend on others. To the extent that 
work is organized on the basis of democratic values, it appears to provide 
more opportunities for work that can enhance these benefits. However, 
if it is organized exclusively on the basis of profitability and efficiency, 
and serves anti-democratic outcomes such as suppressing the choices of 
workers for better alternatives, then it clearly frustrates the values of self-
realization, self-respect, and community. 
 Technology, Automation, and Obsolescence 
 Philosophers have long reflected on the relationship of technology and 
labor. Both Plato and Aristotle claim that “practical action”  (phrónēsis) 
and “craftsmanship”  (téchne) play substantial roles in the acquisition of 
knowledge, virtue, and the highest good. In the twentieth century, Martin 
Heidegger and Herbert Marcuse contend that modern technology objec-
tifies the world to the detriment of human flourishing. The latter, more 
pessimistic, view resonated in particular among those who survived the 
death and destruction of both the First and Second World War. Before 
considering the effects of technology on work, we should pause to con-
sider this more fundamental question of how technology itself ought to 
be evaluated. 
 There are two competing theories here—instrumentalism and sub-
stantivism. The first defends a view widely shared by governments, tech-
nocrats, and policymakers that technology is value-neutral because it is 
merely a means to achieve ends that are external to it. As a means, it can 
have no value in itself because only those agents who wield it can have 
values. The second claims technology “constitutes a new cultural system 
that restructures the entire social world as an object of control” (Feen-
berg 2002: 6). On this view, means and ends are deeply intertwined, so 
that the former inevitably embodies values that influence and shape the 
latter. Whether technology is value-neutral is not our focus  per se . If it is 
neutral, its effects on work will be determined by the values of agents uti-
lizing them, but if not, its effects will be determined by values it embodies 
in its design and implementation. The purpose of introducing these theo-
ries is that they provide different conceptual resources for evaluating the 
effects of technology on work. This is the case in terms of its instrumental 
effects, as well as the profound influence that technology has in shaping 
the ends of those agents who use it. 
 What about the effects of technology on work? First, it has signifi-
cant effects on work when applied to methods of production because it 
15032-2440-006.indd   99 6/15/2019   12:00:17 PM
100 Kory P. Schaff
utilizes resources more efficiently and increases the productivity of labor. 
Adam Smith made this observation a basic part of his theory of economic 
development: 
 This great increase of the quantity of work, which, in consequence 
of the division of labour, the same number of people are capable of 
performing, is owing to three different circumstances; first, to the 
increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, to the 
saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing from one spe-
cies of work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a great number 
of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man 
to do the work of many. 
 (Smith 1776: 11) 
 The introduction of machines and innovation of new techniques for pro-
duction helps to alleviate work comprised of physical, redundant, and 
dangerous tasks. This saves time for workers by reducing the need for 
labor power but also protects their health and longevity by mediating 
between them and harmful work. Technology also facilitates the special-
ization of labor in this regard. The increase of innovation creates new 
kinds of work for it in the division of labor. With this specialization arises 
new and expanded opportunities for the development of social capital in 
the form of skills, training, and education. The development of this social 
capital spurs further innovation and specialization, thereby complet-
ing the dynamic loop of development and wealth that supposedly “lifts 
all boats with the rising tide.” 11 Moreover, technology can also expand 
opportunities for leisure. Since it creates more wealth, it can be used to 
improve the use of income that is earned from work. For example, with 
a reduction in the necessary labor time, individuals have more time to 
enjoy activities that do not require them to use their labor power. 
 The effects of technology on work are not always optimal, however. 
We noted in the last section that the instrumental value of work cuts both 
ways, so to speak, in terms of its benefits and burdens. Although work 
provides individuals with the benefit of an income, it is a burden if that 
income is not adequate to satisfy needs and pursue a life plan. Technol-
ogy is similar in this respect. While its effects can improve the benefits of 
work, it can also exacerbate its burdens. An example of this “Catch-22” 
is the propensity it has to increase productivity and create overwork at 
the same time. In her study  The Overworked American , the economist 
Juliet Schor describes the problem this way: 
 Productivity measures the goods and services that result from each 
hour worked. When productivity rises, a worker can either produce 
the current output in less time, or remain at work the same number 
of hours and produce more. Every time productivity increases, we 
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are presented with the possibility of either more free time or more 
money. That’s the productivity dividend. 
 (Schor 1991: 2) 
 She discovers a significant trend in the American economy that started 
in 1948 and continues today. During this time, the pace of innovation 
occurred steadily while productivity more than doubled, so we can now 
produce a 1948 standard of living with less than half the work hours 
needed in that year. However, nothing of that productivity dividend led 
to decreased work hours and increased leisure. Americans now work 
more and longer hours than they have at any time in the past. We might 
explain this trade-off in terms of instrumentalism: Technology did not 
cause the burden of increased work hours because it is value-neutral. To 
determine the cause of overwork, we would have to look closer at the 
actions of the agents employing the technology. The failure of workers to 
capitalize on this dividend by taking more leisure time might, therefore, 
be attributed to the values of agents and not the technology itself. For 
economists, this outcome merely signals that workers themselves prefer 
to increase income rather than take more leisure. However, a more likely 
explanation seems to be that weak labor laws, coupled with declining 
participation in unions, helped suppress the alternative choice of taking 
more leisure time. 
 To understand the imperatives that govern technology and shape the 
ends of agents, we need to understand that the structure of modern capi-
talism is composed of private ownership over the means of production, 
wage labor, and expansion of technology. As Weber noted, perhaps its 
most distinctive feature is “rationally organized labor.” This rational-
ity is instrumental because the price of wage labor is determined by the 
market principles of supply and demand. As a result, the structure of 
capitalist property relations contributes to the alienation of workers by 
treating them as variables in the calculation of profit. According to Marx, 
workers do not own either the resources they use or the commodities 
they produce with them and become estranged from themselves and one 
another as a result ( Marx 1844 : 63–64). Under these conditions, the pro-
ductivity of labor is intensified and alternatives for leisure are suppressed. 
Marx observed this trade-off between productivity and leisure as well. 
He claims technology decisively favors the former over the latter because 
it embodies unequal property relations and emphasizes efficiency and 
exploitation: 
 If machinery is the most powerful means of raising the productivity 
of labour, i.e. of shortening the working time needed to produce a 
commodity, it is also, as a  repository of capital , the most powerful 
means of lengthening the working day beyond all natural limits in 
those industries first directly seized on by it. It creates, on the one 
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hand, new conditions which permit capital to give free rein to this 
tendency, and on the other hand, new incentives which whet its insa-
tiable appetite for the labour of others. 
 ( Marx 1867 : 526; italics mine) 
 Since technology is designed and implemented to intensify productivity, 
labor becomes an integral part of this technical process. Accordingly, “it 
is animated by the drive to reduce to a minimum the resistance offered 
by man, that obstinate yet elastic natural barrier” ( Marx 1867 : 527). 
Insofar as labor is a commodity in this equation, it is subjected to the 
imperatives of this drive for improved productivity and increased profit. 
Such influence helps explain the outcome of the trade-off between pro-
ductivity and leisure. For workers, the latter is foreclosed as a viable 
alternative because the system is organized by the imperatives of instru-
mental rationality. The conditions of work are thereby shaped by what 
Michel Foucault describes as “disciplines,” or ever more refined modes of 
control, in the form of surveillance and normalization ( Foucault 1975 ). 
Modern equivalents of these disciplines include unscheduled drug tests, 
task monitoring, and incentives for careerism that supplant preferences 
for leisure. 
 Suppose the claim of substantivism is true that technology embod-
ies values that shape the ends of those agents using it. Under modern 
capitalism, these values objectify the environment and its inhabitants, 
subjecting it and them to increasingly instrumental modes of control. 
The members of the Frankfurt School developed and defended a “critical 
theory” along these lines, arguing that modern technology replaces the 
substantial values of humans conceived as social members with instru-
mental ones conceiving of them merely as producers and consumers. 12 In 
these conditions, the social relations that are the inter-subjective condi-
tions for substantive values are replaced with the technical imperatives 
of efficiency and profit. These effects are not mutually exclusive with the 
benefits that technology seems to provide, given that its widely touted 
benefits could just be further modes of control. Marcuse claims these ben-
efits are thinly disguised countervailing effects that sustain and repro-
duce the ideology of “one-dimensional society” (Marcuse 1964: 12). The 
decrease of physical labor and increase of pleasure-seeking experiences 
create the conditions in which autonomy is reduced to the repetition of 
work and consumption. Even though technology improves the efficient 
allocation of resources and this enhances “welfare” (defined according to 
such values), the process negatively affects workers by decreasing oppor-
tunities for self-realization, self-respect, and solidarity. These values are 
sacrificed in the short run by the imperatives of technology, because the 
“creative destruction” of modern capitalism sells itself on the assump-
tion that new, better opportunities for work are always created as part 
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of this process. That is not always the case, however, though it might be 
sometimes (Uchitelle 2006: Ch. 3). 
 Since technical innovation has immediate and significant costs to 
workers’ welfare, these costs ought to be weighed against any potential 
future benefits. Yet the anti-democratic organization of work frustrates 
the participation of workers to help determine their own fate where inno-
vation and obsolescence are concerned. A seemingly innocuous example 
of the technical intensification of labor in this respect is the use of digital 
communication in our daily lives. The introduction of “smart” phones 
and tablets, and our tendency to rely on these seamless modes of interac-
tion, expands the productivity of work beyond normal business hours. By 
and large, we have accepted the invasiveness of such devices on the basis 
of their efficiency so that the new normal is to work everywhere and at 
all times. Whether that is a benefit or a burden might seem like a question 
that is relative to an individual’s preferences, but the real issue is whether 
workers get a substantial voice in how such technology is used. The fact 
that we have assimilated their use into our culture so quickly without 
much personal reflection or public debate is telling in this regard. 
 Finally, the intensification of labor merely precedes the next and final 
stage in the domination of technology over human beings. The present 
stage increases production with more efficient means, while the industrial 
destruction of the environment is reframed as “progress” for humankind. 
It is not just the resources of nature that are viewed as raw materials to 
serve the ends that are dictated by this form of rationality, but also work-
ers themselves. They are used to create the goods and services that ensure 
the perpetual motion of the commodity machine, until they are replaced 
with more efficient machines in the form of computers, algorithms, and 
automated systems. In the earliest stage of industrialization, G.W.F. Hegel 
anticipated this outcome: “The abstraction of production makes work 
increasingly  mechanical so that the human being is eventually able to 
step aside and let a  machine take his place” (Hegel 1821: §198). The ulti-
mate effect of technology is obsolescence—replacing work with machines. 
While it raises obvious concerns about how workers will satisfy their wel-
fare, the process does not end with the mere replacement of workers by 
machines. What may happen next is the subject of both dystopian science 
fiction and popular entertainment—the obsolescence not just of work, but 
also of workers themselves. In a pessimistic narrative that can be traced 
back to substantivism, the “rise of the machines” is the end game in which 
humans are either hunted down and eliminated or cultivated as batteries 
to power the machines. Perhaps these scenarios are merely the stuff of 
imagination, but serious questions remain: What will happen to humans 
when the level of technology that is achieved truly makes it possible to 
reduce the workday, or eliminate it altogether? What will happen to work-
ers who are replaced with machines? How will they satisfy their welfare? 
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 Basic Income and Inequality 
 In this section, we shall examine the benefits of a basic income scheme 
with an emphasis on what makes it an appealing alternative for address-
ing the problem of inequality. In its conception, the idea is rather simple 
and elegant. All qualified individuals will receive a cash grant regardless 
of their employment history, income, or status. The grant is universal and 
unrestricted since all beneficiaries will receive the same amount and all of 
them are free to use it however they choose. 13 In addition, basic income is 
often defended as viable policy for ensuring a social minimum that avoids 
some of the problems of traditional welfare policies. The idea of provid-
ing this social minimum in the form of a universal grant has increased 
in popularity in democratic welfare states for this reason. 14 This idea is 
appealing to both right- and left-leaning theorists and policymakers alike 
for the following reasons: On one the hand, libertarians argue that provi-
sion of a basic income eliminates the need for paternalistic welfare poli-
cies, enhances the buying power of consumers, and ultimately promotes 
economic growth. On the other hand, egalitarians claim it will address 
the problem of inequality by ensuring a social minimum for all regard-
less of contribution or status. The appeal of such a scheme across the 
traditional economic spectrum has also been spurred by the growth of a 
cottage industry advocating on its behalf, as well as political parties who 
have taken up its cause in the European Union and beyond. 15 As a result, 
dozens of states and local governments around the world from Finland 
to Bakersfield, CA, have created pilot programs to test the feasibility of a 
basic income scheme. 
 A basic income scheme has two major benefits when compared with tra-
ditional welfare measures. First, it promotes the value of liberty by allow-
ing persons to choose what to do with their share of the grant. In doing 
so, it avoids the paternalism of traditional welfare policies, which often 
require the least well off to provide evidence of need by submitting their 
private lives to invasive state procedures. A basic income grant avoids this 
“means-testing” because one does not have to lack means to get it. The 
grant is paid to everyone regardless of means and no questions are asked 
about how or where it is used. This will obviously appeal to libertarians 
and liberals alike who reject paternalism in favor of individual liberty. 
Second, basic income also promotes the value of equality by subsidizing a 
more egalitarian distribution of resources arising from social cooperation. 
Rather than basing its distribution on income, in which the wealthy pay 
higher tax rates to provide resources that can be redistributed to the least 
well off, basic income provides a cash grant that all citizens are entitled to 
regardless of their contribution. As such, it avoids a familiar objection to 
the welfare state that “free riders” benefit from such policies without pay-
ing any of the costs. This objection looms large in the economics of envy 
and politics of resentment, fostering opposition to taxation and welfare 
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assistance, and supporting a disturbing form of scapegoating that is cur-
rently resurgent in debates about immigration and sovereignty. 16 
 For these reasons, Phillipe Van Parijs claims that a basic income scheme 
has the potential to reconcile the conflicting values of liberty and equality 
in democratic welfare states. His theory of “real-freedom-for-all” is based 
on the libertarian conviction that the efficiency of markets can be used to 
expand the liberal value of equality by providing a social minimum to all 
that avoids the objections just described. According to Van Parijs, the prin-
ciple of “real-freedom-for-all” combines the formal freedom of negative 
liberty to do as one pleases (short of coercion or harm to others), with an 
all-purpose means for realizing the ends of positive liberty. Subsequently, 
he advocates granting all citizens an equal share of a bundle of resources 
consistent with “security” and “self-ownership” (Van Parijs 1995: 33). 
In effect, this libertarian approach avoids the problem of redistributing 
 downward by “taking from the rich and giving to the poor” and retains 
the egalitarian commitment to the value of equality. All beneficiaries can 
use these means for whatever purpose they want. Some examples that 
may help reduce inequality include buying insurance against sickness or 
unemployment, giving the grant to charity, supplementing consumption 
habits, and working less to take more leisure. An obvious attraction of 
basic income, then, is its practical flexibility. The cash grant can be used 
in diverse ways, many of which will contribute to economic growth that, 
in turn, could increase the amount of the grant over time. 
 A relevant feature of Van Parijs’s proposal here is that basic income 
can, in principle, reduce the now dominant reliance on work. He claims 
that one way it splits the difference, so to speak, between capitalism and 
socialism is it displaces work as the primary requirement for a social 
minimum. A problem with that displacement, however, is it does not fit 
neatly (not yet, anyway) with the normative principle in capitalism that 
reward ought to be a product of contribution. For this reason, it “differs 
from a social insurance scheme to the extent that its beneficiaries need 
not have contributed to it out of their past earnings in order to be entitled 
to benefit from it” (Van Parijs 1995: 34). While Van Parijs stresses the 
compatibility of basic income with the values of liberty and equality, the 
ideal of this policy does not actually fit well with a central tenet of both 
capitalism and socialism, namely, reciprocal contribution and reward. 
One relevant objection here is that individuals will opt out of working 
altogether as the amount of the grant increases: 
 The real freedom to accept a low-paid job one would like to take, 
whether because of its intrinsic appeal or because of the training or 
experience it provides, is unambiguously increased as the level of the 
unconditional income goes up.  
 (Van Parijs 1995: 37) 
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 The more their income is supplemented by the grant, the more likely it 
is that individuals will opt out of full-time work and perhaps even work 
altogether, preferring instead to be surfers who are fed by the productive 
contribution of others. 
 The worry here is that basic income’s effect on work can undermine 
its efficacy and success at reconciling the values of liberty and equality. 
Insofar as the cash grant diminishes the necessity of work and pushes its 
value in the direction of freely undertaken labor, it can lead to economic 
inefficiencies. With the right mix of incentives that larger amounts of 
the grant would induce, it has the potential to undercut productive 
contribution over time as workers leave the labor market altogether. 
In turn, this will decrease the total value of resources to be distributed, 
thereby leading to a decrease in the amount of the grant over time. One 
endemic feature of capitalism that makes this problem more likely is the 
boom-bust cycle and its relation to unemployment. When the market 
is booming and unemployment is low, the amount of the grant will be 
higher and may induce individuals to reduce their work hours for more 
leisure time. But when the market is a bust and unemployment is high, 
the amount of the grant will be lower, even though individuals will 
likely rely on it to make up for lost income. In this scenario, the cost 
of keeping the grant at pre-recession levels will increase along with the 
political pressure to do so, but the economics of doing so are murky and 
hard to predict. 
 There are other technical difficulties that face the success of a basic 
income scheme as well. For example, whether the grant is paid in full 
annually or provided by regular installments can change some of the 
complexities we have been discussing. While one or the other might be 
more or less efficient economically, paying the grant out in equal install-
ments could lead to a paternalist effect on the choices of beneficiaries, 
something the proposal is supposed to avoid (Van Parijs 1995: 46–47). 
Another problem that faces the “universal” feature of a basic income 
grant is that of capabilities and disadvantage. An equal share of resources 
provided to all in the form of a grant cannot achieve the egalitarian aim 
of equalizing the net benefits accrued by it where moral luck is concerned. 
As Amartya Sen claims, individuals with a lower threshold of functioning 
require a larger share of resources to translate functioning into capabili-
ties ( Sen 1992 ). For individuals with physical disabilities, a greater share 
of resources is required in order to achieve the same level of capabil-
ity as the able-bodied. In this respect, the “universal” feature of a basic 
income grant may have to be modified more to address the complexities 
of “difference” as a critical normative consideration of equality. 17 These 
problems might raise some doubts about the ethical and economic appeal 
that basic income offers, but they cannot be resolved here. At the very 
least, a basic income scheme warrants serious consideration and further 
research. 
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 The Limits of a Basic Income in the Age of Automation 
 So far, we have established that the instrumental and non-pecuniary ben-
efits of work are a mixed picture at best. Under cyclical market condi-
tions, these benefits are often turned into burdens by contingent forces 
beyond the control of workers. The income that work provides is a good 
thing if it is sufficient to satisfy needs and support life plans, but if not, 
or there is no work available, it becomes a serious burden. These same 
forces also influence the benefits of self-realization, self-respect, and com-
munity that work can provide, leading to jobs that are exploitative and 
coercive and that diminish autonomy. When the effects of technology 
are added to this picture, these burdens are intensified. To be sure, the 
advance of science and technology has had a significant impact on life. 
It is has decreased injuries, disease, and death, as well as improved our 
understanding of the universe and our place within it. Yet the benefits of 
technology do not necessarily improve working conditions for everyone. 
The domination of instrumental rationality leads to the intensification of 
labor and, in many cases, exacerbates its burdensome aspects. 
 What happens when basic income is added to the picture we have just 
described? At a glance, ensuring a social minimum for all citizens seems 
to be an elegant solution to some serious problems facing the democratic 
welfare state. With the cash provided by such a grant, workers can sup-
plement their income and enjoy greater buying power, or reduce their 
work hours for more leisure time. Moreover, it has the potential to offset 
the harms caused by job loss and remove some of the stigma attached 
to unemployment and welfare assistance. Although it can augment the 
financial benefits of work in these respects, by itself a basic income grant 
cannot replace self-realization, self-respect, and community. In line with 
Van Parijs’s slogan of “real-freedom-for-all,” one might object that pro-
viding individuals with these means is an optimal way to help individuals 
to realize their ends. A basic income guarantees a flexible form of support 
that can support any and all values in this respect. However, before giving 
up altogether on the non-pecuniary benefits that work offers, it is worth 
considering some limitations of basic income. 
 First, it seems that a basic income scheme will have little effect on 
reducing inequality. While it augments the income of beneficiaries, and 
this sounds like good policy especially for struggling low-income earners, 
this does not reduce inequality. One reason it will have little effect in this 
respect is that the grant is paid out in an equal amount to everyone, so 
its effects on the  distribution of income will actually be nil. The concen-
tration of wealth and the growing income gap is a significant problem 
that should give us pause. For example, the three richest individuals in 
the United States together own more than 50% of its income earners, 
which is 63% of American households, or 160 million workers ( Kirsch 
2018 ). Those numbers are staggering and suggest more needs to be done 
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to constrain the typical unequal distribution of wealth. A basic income 
scheme tries to avoid the problems associated with redistributive poli-
cies, but for this reason, it is not well designed to constrain the growth of 
inequality. Putting a social minimum in place may improve the welfare of 
the least well off to be sure, but it seems inequality will remain relatively 
unchanged and that is concerning. 
 Second, the provision of a basic income grant augments the income of 
individuals to satisfy needs and support their life plans. In effect, it will 
likely be used for more consumption, which can have social and envi-
ronmental consequences. One social effect of increasing consumption is 
that inequality will be exacerbated. As Shor notes about current debates 
among policymakers, there is a consensus the problem of inequality can 
be solved “by getting more income into more people’s hands” ( Schor 
2000 : 5–6). She takes exception to this view because the goals of redis-
tribution and growth are insensitive to the fact that consumption is part 
of the problem. Schor claims that the solution of  more income “leads to 
consumption practices that exacerbate and reproduce class and social 
inequalities, resulting in, and perhaps even worsening, an unequal dis-
tribution of income” (Schor 1991: 6). This is driven by the features of 
what she calls “new consumerism” that perpetuate the upscaling of life-
style norms, spending beyond the relative means of one’s income, and 
consuming luxury goods that are branded as status symbols. Given 
these trends, putting more cash in the hands of consumers will exacer-
bate inequalities, especially for low-income households and communi-
ties of color. Thus, basic income may unwittingly make the distribution 
of inequality worse off by giving individuals the freedom to spend the 
grant how they want. Since most individuals have shown themselves to 
be irrational consumers for the most part, giving them more unrestricted 
income will simply contribute to the problem of inequality. 
 Another social effect that a basic income scheme may have is a dimin-
ished sense of community. In the absence of work, and without a sense 
of worth that accompanies engaging with others to achieve a common 
purpose, a basic income will leave individuals without a major source 
of social interaction. There are other venues that may replace lost work 
in this respect, but whether these offer self-realization, self-respect, and 
community with a common purpose is unclear. One reason why is that 
these benefits depend on standing in social relations with others, while 
lacking work undercuts the ability of one to stand in such relations. After 
losing their jobs, individuals report feeling more isolated and getting less 
enjoyment out of their daily activities ( Uchitelle 2006 ). It is true that work 
is not the only context in which social relations provide support for doing 
productive activities, gaining a sense of worth, or engaging with others in 
a common purpose. However, for most workers, it is clearly a significant 
form of such support. If machines replace jobs and entire industries are 
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automated, the elimination of social relations found in workplaces will 
almost certainly diminish a sense of community. Whether that can be 
replaced by other social relations, or how quickly that process of adjust-
ment will take, is an empirical question that cannot be answered here. 
 Finally, a basic income grant that increases income and consumption 
raises worries about the environmental limits of welfare policies that are 
based exclusively on economic growth. There is a serious concern among 
scientists that the rapid growth of industrialization over the last century, 
which is predicated on burning fossil fuels, has already pushed the planet 
past its tipping point in the direction of massive and inhospitable climate 
changes. We are looking at a future planet that will be significantly warmer, 
with more intense weather events, diminished natural resources, and sig-
nificantly larger populations requiring more resources to satisfy welfare. 
Schor claims there can be no common solution to these problems without 
addressing the underlying patterns of consumption that feed them: 
 [I]t is difficult to make an ethical argument that people in one of the 
world’s richest countries need more when the global income gap is 
so wide, the disparity in world resource use so enormous, and the 
possibility that we are already consuming beyond Earth’s ecological 
carrying capacity so likely. 
 ( Schor 2000 : 7) 
 Under these circumstances, a basic income scheme is more likely to con-
tribute to the problem of consuming beyond our ecological limits by 
providing a grant to individuals that immediately boosts their buying 
power as consumers. Perhaps basic income can be part of a solution to 
these problems by encouraging workers to reduce work hours, take more 
leisure time, and engage in sustainable forms of consumption. However, 
in an age of automation where many workers are likely replaced by 
machines, and where goods and services can be produced more efficiently, 
it is hard to predict what they would do with their time and money. If we 
already spend most of our time working in order to consume, as Schor 
ably shows, it seems that a sudden increase in unstructured time brought 
on by part-time work or unemployment will be filled by consuming more 
of those goods and services. That is not an outcome either the planet or 
future generations can afford. 
 What is to be done? The question remains an open-ended one. At the 
very least, the current debate about basic income and the need for a social 
minimum pushes us to answer the question. When we also consider the 
benefits and burdens of work, the effects of automation on the future 
of work, and the viability of basic income in this context, it is clear that 
democratic welfare states need to develop new strategies for resolving the 
problems that are endemic to them. 
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 Notes 
 1 . An early version of this argument is made by  Rifkin (1995 ), and an insight-
ful economic history of technology and obsolescence can be found in  Slade 
(2007 ). A recent review of technical developments can be found in  Wired , 
“A.I. and the future of work” ( 2018 ). 
 2 . For studies of these themes in ancient Greek thought, see Meiksens  Wood 
(1997 ) and  Murphy (1993 ). The idea of work as punishment in the thought 
of St. Augustine is described in  Kidwell (2013 ). 
 3 . In its conception, the self-realization argument is a version of Marx’s argu-
ment about alienated labor. He claims that the “species-being”  (Gattungswe-
sen) of human beings is social labor, and under capitalism the form this labor 
takes alienates individuals from this essential nature ( Marx  1844 : 58–68; 
Brudney 1998: Ch. 4). 
 4 . I am not suggesting it is impossible for individuals without work to have 
self-respect, but as studies of the consequences of unemployment show, self-
respect  suffers from the lack of work in most contexts. 
 5 . A critique of the skilled/unskilled distinction can be found in  Crawford 
(2009 : Ch. 2). 
 6 . A good review of the literature on the psychological and physiological harms 
of unemployment and joblessness can be found in  Uchitelle (2006 : Ch. 8). 
 7 . See  Warren, Thompson, and Saegert (2001 : Ch. 1). 
 8 . The most comprehensive discussion of these concepts can be found in  Wert-
heimer (1987 ,  1996 ). 
 9 . The costs and benefits of vertical work organization are reviewed by  McPher-
son (1983 ),  Bowles and Gintis (1993 ),  Schweickart (2002 ),  Schaff (2012 ), 
and  Anderson (2017 ). 
 10 . For a recent defense of a right to work as fair conditions of employment, see 
 Schaff (2017 ). 
 11 . This statement is often mistakenly attributed to Adam Smith, but it is actu-
ally a slogan used by the New England Council, a regional chamber of com-
merce, which President John F. Kennedy appropriated and first used in a 
speech in 1963. 
 12 . This is the basis of Jürgen Habermas’s claim that the “life-world,” which 
grounds the communicative action and inter-subjective relations of rational 
agents, is eclipsed by a “system” of instrumental and technological domina-
tion (Habermas 1985). 
 13 . One problem that is not addressed here is the question of who qualifies for 
basic income. Most theorists and policymakers advocate for it on the assump-
tion that citizenship is the proper category for the benefit, but the presence 
of migrant workers and undocumented immigrants in market economies, 
whether they contribute or not, complicates this question. For a review of 
this question, see  Bay and Pedersen (2006 ). 
 14 . There is a historical pedigree to basic income. Rawls mentions the so-called 
negative income tax in this respect, which was a popular topic of policy discus-
sions in the 1970s following the Great Society programs. Ideally, this policy 
would involve a systematic transfer of resources through a reverse income tax 
that progressively pays greater compensation to the least well off (Rawls, 243). 
 15 . Examples include Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), US Basic Income 
Guarantee Network (USBIG), and Basic Income Canada Network, among 
many others. 
 16 . While this phenomenon is not new historically, it has become resurgent in 
the form of misinformation and propaganda that led to Brexit in the United 
Kingdom and Trumpism in the United States. 
 17 . See  Anderson (1999 ) for a discussion of difference and equality in this respect. 
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